Paraconsistent Modal Logics

AbstractWe introduce a modal expansion of paraconsistent Nelson logic that is also as a generalization of the Belnapian modal logic recently introduced by Odintsov and Wansing. We prove algebraic completeness theorems for both logics, defining and axiomatizing the corresponding algebraic semantics. We provide a representation for these algebras in terms of twist-structures, generalizing a known result on the representation of the algebraic counterpart of paraconsistent Nelson logic

Quasi-Nelson Algebras

Abstract We introduce a generalization of Nelson algebras having a not-necessarily involutive negation; we suggest to dub this class quasi-Nelson algebras in analogy with quasi-De Morgan lattices, these being a non-involutive generalization of De Morgan lattices. We show that, similarly to the involutive case (and perhaps surprisingly), our new class of algebras can be equivalently presented as (1) quasi-Nelson residuated lattices, i.e. models of the well-known Full Lambek calculus with exchange and weakening, extended with the Nelson axiom; (2) non-involutive twist-structures, i.e. special products of Heyting algebras, which generalize the well-known construction for representing algebraic models of Nelson's constructive logic with strong negation; (3) quasi-Nelson algebras, i.e. models of non-involutive Nelson logic viewed as a conservative expansion of the negation-free fragment of intuitionistic logic. The equivalence of the three presentations, and in particular the extension of the twist-structure representation to the non-involutive case, is the main technical result of the paper. We hope, however, that the main impact may be the possibility of opening new ways to (i) obtain deeper insights into the distinguishing feature of Nelson's logic (the Nelson axiom) and its algebraic counterpart; (ii) be able to investigate certain purely algebraic properties (such as 3-potency and (0,1)-congruence orderability) in a more general setting

An infinity of super-Belnap logics

We look at extensions (i.e., stronger logics in the same language) of the Belnap–Dunn four-valued logic. We prove the existence of a countable chain of logics that extend the Belnap–Dunn and do not coincide with any of the known extensions (Kleene’s logics, Priest’s logic of paradox). We characterise the reduced algebraic models of these new log- ics and prove a completeness result for the first and last element of the chain stating that both logics are determined by a single finite logical matrix. We show that the last logic of the chain is not finitely axiomatisable